main/openssl: security upgrade to 3.1.2

main/openssl/APKBUILD

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 # Contributor: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
 # Maintainer: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
 pkgname=openssl
-pkgver=3.1.1
+pkgver=3.1.2
 _abiver=${pkgver%.*.*}
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Toolkit for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"
 url="https://www.openssl.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dbg $pkgname-libs-static $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc
 	libcrypto$_abiver:_libcrypto libssl$_abiver:_libssl"
 source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	man-section.patch
-	CVE-2023-2975.patch
-	CVE-2023-3446.patch
 	"
 builddir="$srcdir/openssl-$pkgver"
 
 # secfixes:
+#   3.1.2-r0:
+#     - CVE-2023-3817
 #   3.1.1-r3:
 #     - CVE-2023-3446
 #   3.1.1-r2:
@@ -205,8 +205,6 @@ _libssl() {
 }
 
 sha512sums="
-8ba9dd6ab87451e126c19cc106ccd1643ca48667d6c37504d0ab98205fbccf855fd0db54474b4113c4c3a15215a4ef77a039fb897a69f71bcab2054b2effd1d9  openssl-3.1.1.tar.gz
+9f41113e5537aee4c3f92711ff85fa12da080363fef0c8b8b34e5b3fc608473c6e4cadd9d8c78f2fcbe97462e51f26a0bb6781656a69ad40226e68af2cf2c762  openssl-3.1.2.tar.gz
 8c44e990fe8a820f649631b9f81cf28225b7516065169a7f68e2dd7c067b30df9b2c6cb88fa826afbc9fcdaf156360aabf7c498d2d9ed452968815b12b004809  man-section.patch
-a7bfa88c885adff916e578571e6aef6c2e20f8ca768ffedbea2d5a77dc7165859285cd78a1cccc665aa552e4c87a23f40c1d9a27db85f658d85b5cafa2c0f8fd  CVE-2023-2975.patch
-8841509389078570dd6e491bc3bf0778d6d4d2313d772e90b2eba8f8c47350d44ce38b345fea41f9dcf29f1d8192596ebe79d57b800d45752d500505fda9fdfd  CVE-2023-3446.patch
 "

main/openssl/CVE-2023-2975.patch

-Patch-Source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/6a83f0c958811f07e0d11dfc6b5a6a98edfd5bdc
---
-From 6a83f0c958811f07e0d11dfc6b5a6a98edfd5bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:30:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Do not ignore empty associated data with AES-SIV mode
-
-The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items
-authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length.
-
-The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data
-which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also
-a security issue because such empty associated data then become
-unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them.
-
-Fixes CVE-2023-2975
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
-
-(cherry picked from commit c426c281cfc23ab182f7d7d7a35229e7db1494d9)
----
- .../implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c   | 18 +++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
-index 45010b90db2a..b396c8651a32 100644
---- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
-+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
-@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
-     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
-         return 0;
- 
--    if (inl == 0) {
--        *outl = 0;
--        return 1;
--    }
-+    /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
-+    if (out != NULL) {
-+        if (inl == 0) {
-+            if (outl != NULL)
-+                *outl = 0;
-+            return 1;
-+        }
- 
--    if (outsize < inl) {
--        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
--        return 0;
-+        if (outsize < inl) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-     }
- 
-     if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)

main/openssl/CVE-2023-3446.patch

-Patch-Source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/fc9867c1e03c22ebf56943be205202e576aabf23
---
-From fc9867c1e03c22ebf56943be205202e576aabf23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
-
-The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
-that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
-value even if it is excessively large.
-
-There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
-OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
-perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
-new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
-
-An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
-obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
-Service attack.
-
-The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
-functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
-similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
-DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
-
-CVE-2023-3446
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9e0094e2aa1b3428a12d5095132f133c078d3c3d)
----
- crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 6 ++++++
- include/openssl/dh.h | 6 +++++-
- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-index 0b391910d6b3..84a926998e9b 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
-     if (nid != NID_undef)
-         return 1;
- 
-+    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
-         return 0;
- 
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
-index ec5a493da129..499f9f7109dd 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dh.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
-@@ -92,7 +92,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
- #  include <openssl/dherr.h>
- 
- #  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
--#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
-+#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS        10000
-+#  endif
-+
-+#  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-+#   define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
- #  endif
- 
- #  define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024