community/sudo: backport fix for CVE-2022-43995

(cherry picked from commit 6de85be8)

community/sudo/APKBUILD

@@ -8,14 +8,15 @@ if [ "${pkgver%_*}" != "$pkgver" ]; then
 else
 	_realver=$pkgver
 fi
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Give certain users the ability to run some commands as root"
 url="https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/"
 arch="all"
 license="custom ISC"
 makedepends="zlib-dev bash mandoc"
 subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev"
-source="https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-$_realver.tar.gz"
+source="https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-$_realver.tar.gz
+	CVE-2022-43995.patch"
 options="suid"
 builddir="$srcdir/sudo-$_realver"
 
@@ -68,4 +69,5 @@ package() {
 
 sha512sums="
 34ee165baa2e37ba2530901d49bf0dad30159f27aeccd2519d4719bf93be8281edff71220a49ba2e41dacaa3c58031de1464df48d75a8caea7b9568a76f80b67  sudo-1.9.12.tar.gz
+47f7b14663a2e98dc98190346361f447c4a0b71fa3074d2c9dcaf15ef0cac7621bea27e25cced6f6005ada4deb4b11521dc418bf25bca18b70feafc6f7e6f359  CVE-2022-43995.patch
 "

community/sudo/CVE-2022-43995.patch

+From bd209b9f16fcd1270c13db27ae3329c677d48050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 07:29:55 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2022-43995, potential heap overflow for passwords < 8
+ characters. Starting with sudo 1.8.0 the plaintext password buffer is
+ dynamically sized so it is not safe to assume that it is at least 9 bytes in
+ size. Found by Hugo Lefeuvre (University of Manchester) with ConfFuzz.
+
+---
+ plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c | 11 +++++------
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c b/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c
+index b2046eca2..0416861e9 100644
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ sudo_passwd_init(struct passwd *pw, sudo_auth *auth)
+ int
+ sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_conv_callback *callback)
+ {
+-    char sav, *epass;
++    char des_pass[9], *epass;
+     char *pw_epasswd = auth->data;
+     size_t pw_len;
+     int matched = 0;
+@@ -75,12 +75,12 @@ sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_c
+ 
+     /*
+      * Truncate to 8 chars if standard DES since not all crypt()'s do this.
+-     * If this turns out not to be safe we will have to use OS #ifdef's (sigh).
+      */
+-    sav = pass[8];
+     pw_len = strlen(pw_epasswd);
+-    if (pw_len == DESLEN || HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len))
+-	pass[8] = '\0';
++    if (pw_len == DESLEN || HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len)) {
++	strlcpy(des_pass, pass, sizeof(des_pass));
++	pass = des_pass;
++    }
+ 
+     /*
+      * Normal UN*X password check.
+@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_c
+      * only compare the first DESLEN characters in that case.
+      */
+     epass = (char *) crypt(pass, pw_epasswd);
+-    pass[8] = sav;
+     if (epass != NULL) {
+ 	if (HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len) && strlen(epass) == DESLEN)
+ 	    matched = !strncmp(pw_epasswd, epass, DESLEN);