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Commit b53d4783 authored by prymeroot's avatar prymeroot
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main/libxrender: upgrade to 0.9.8

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main/libxrender/APKBUILD
+ 6
− 27
View file @ b53d4783
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=libxrender
pkgver=0.9.7
pkgrel=1
pkgver=0.9.8
pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="X Rendering Extension client library"
url="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/"
arch="all"
......@@ -10,22 +10,10 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev"
depends=
depends_dev="xproto renderproto libx11-dev"
makedepends="$depends_dev"
source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXrender-$pkgver.tar.bz2
CVE-2013-1987-1.patch
CVE-2013-1987-2.patch
CVE-2013-1987-3.patch
"
source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXrender-$pkgver.tar.bz2"
_builddir="$srcdir"/libXrender-$pkgver
prepare() {
cd "$_builddir"
for i in $source; do
case $i in
*.patch) msg $i; patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/$i || return 1;;
esac
done
}
build() {
cd "$_builddir"
......@@ -38,15 +26,6 @@ package() {
make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install || return 1
rm "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/*.la || return 1
}
md5sums="ee62f4c7f0f16ced4da63308963ccad2 libXrender-0.9.7.tar.bz2
5d82b028bed7456b38f1d001a222b1d8 CVE-2013-1987-1.patch
8e0adc5dcbf89ea1d0c7fe0e0dd5e8d7 CVE-2013-1987-2.patch
b3bac65a7f41bcacbf5fd8278ac709b6 CVE-2013-1987-3.patch"
sha256sums="f9b46b93c9bc15d5745d193835ac9ba2a2b411878fad60c504bbb8f98492bbe6 libXrender-0.9.7.tar.bz2
4a0b2e6d693c86eab43aa6e6720de149298ea67b1ccc10a723bfb9db3787703a CVE-2013-1987-1.patch
7ee9c01f3f20f817c37210147afc50038541bea53b270ce2c3eacf9969821a39 CVE-2013-1987-2.patch
141096ee1b739e2ca4b270215dbf1ad9ed57ad9d0b405256241f0fb8e19a61ce CVE-2013-1987-3.patch"
sha512sums="b52cebf6ebcdfc1e321b4ec7a18ba781cd05ddab9bb191532ea4174848fb7bb7f5bc7e609944e6e193f7b808e5b50316ba74b5bf1024e61b11358ac1887b44dc libXrender-0.9.7.tar.bz2
5ec8fa4531271e9c6904b00fa828a82e3b2904d8ea7f8803da4175b516f9a4b268e44fd90607244850affd9899f12f107bb038b02529983c04c5968a10d74a0d CVE-2013-1987-1.patch
45778c206f35b3ccc814bf68713582e1aeda45f182678ca88e194b0eb45f8f930732d465b3d10ee475892c5b7e0a9a67354b0036e0ffe2989c929c27f828d52b CVE-2013-1987-2.patch
8bee48d9d23ce10aa8076a1c93edd2f2f2b221421ef4d706cacf2f4b23ccb7aea64cfca9fe7766820c8473208fc25d573d72f6a717aa5a0bad9da4297c15af05 CVE-2013-1987-3.patch"
md5sums="2bd9a15fcf64d216e63b8d129e4f1f1c libXrender-0.9.8.tar.bz2"
sha256sums="1d14b02f0060aec5d90dfdcf16a996f17002e515292906ed26e3dcbba0f4fc62 libXrender-0.9.8.tar.bz2"
sha512sums="111a0ec4e19932a50da4914d9112b0a16c1d9c800e2b8398ddaf9ed70dae1a4eb75860282ca62d023e78957bbc3f015cb80d91ba76a24595df9f8a2b7e055b58 libXrender-0.9.8.tar.bz2"
main/libxrender/CVE-2013-1987-1.patch deleted 100644 → 0
+ 0
− 83
View file @ 42c51407
From e52853974664289fe42a92909667ed77cfa1cec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 05:45:20 +0000
Subject: integer overflow in XRenderQueryFilters() [CVE-2013-1987 1/3]
The length, numFilters & numAliases members of the reply are all CARD32
and need to be bounds checked before multiplying & adding them together
to come up with the total size to allocate, to avoid integer overflow
leading to underallocation and writing data from the network past the
end of the allocated buffer.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
---
diff --git a/src/Filter.c b/src/Filter.c
index 924b2a3..edfa572 100644
--- a/src/Filter.c
+++ b/src/Filter.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <config.h>
#endif
#include "Xrenderint.h"
+#include <limits.h>
XFilters *
XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable)
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable)
char *name;
char len;
int i;
- long nbytes, nbytesAlias, nbytesName;
+ unsigned long nbytes, nbytesAlias, nbytesName;
if (!RenderHasExtension (info))
return NULL;
@@ -60,22 +61,32 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable)
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
- /*
- * Compute total number of bytes for filter names
- */
- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
- nbytesAlias = rep.numAliases * 2;
- if (rep.numAliases & 1)
- nbytesAlias += 2;
- nbytesName = nbytes - nbytesAlias;
/*
- * Allocate one giant block for the whole data structure
+ * Limit each component of combined size to 1/4 the max, which is far
+ * more than they should ever possibly need.
*/
- filters = Xmalloc (sizeof (XFilters) +
- rep.numFilters * sizeof (char *) +
- rep.numAliases * sizeof (short) +
- nbytesName);
+ if ((rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) &&
+ (rep.numFilters < ((INT_MAX / 4) / sizeof (char *))) &&
+ (rep.numAliases < ((INT_MAX / 4) / sizeof (short)))) {
+ /*
+ * Compute total number of bytes for filter names
+ */
+ nbytes = (unsigned long)rep.length << 2;
+ nbytesAlias = rep.numAliases * 2;
+ if (rep.numAliases & 1)
+ nbytesAlias += 2;
+ nbytesName = nbytes - nbytesAlias;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate one giant block for the whole data structure
+ */
+ filters = Xmalloc (sizeof (XFilters) +
+ (rep.numFilters * sizeof (char *)) +
+ (rep.numAliases * sizeof (short)) +
+ nbytesName);
+ } else
+ filters = NULL;
if (!filters)
{
--
cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
main/libxrender/CVE-2013-1987-2.patch deleted 100644 → 0
+ 0
− 81
View file @ 42c51407
From 9e577d40322b9e3d8bdefec0eefa44d8ead451a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 06:02:11 +0000
Subject: integer overflow in XRenderQueryFormats() [CVE-2013-1987 2/3]
The length, numFormats, numScreens, numDepths, and numVisuals members of
the reply are all CARD32 and need to be bounds checked before multiplying
and adding them together to come up with the total size to allocate, to
avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from
the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
---
diff --git a/src/Xrender.c b/src/Xrender.c
index 5c8e5f5..a62c753 100644
--- a/src/Xrender.c
+++ b/src/Xrender.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <config.h>
#endif
#include "Xrenderint.h"
+#include <limits.h>
XRenderExtInfo XRenderExtensionInfo;
char XRenderExtensionName[] = RENDER_NAME;
@@ -411,8 +412,8 @@ XRenderQueryFormats (Display *dpy)
CARD32 *xSubpixel;
void *xData;
int nf, ns, nd, nv;
- int rlength;
- int nbytes;
+ unsigned long rlength;
+ unsigned long nbytes;
RenderCheckExtension (dpy, info, 0);
LockDisplay (dpy);
@@ -458,18 +459,29 @@ XRenderQueryFormats (Display *dpy)
if (async_state.major_version == 0 && async_state.minor_version < 6)
rep.numSubpixel = 0;
- xri = (XRenderInfo *) Xmalloc (sizeof (XRenderInfo) +
- rep.numFormats * sizeof (XRenderPictFormat) +
- rep.numScreens * sizeof (XRenderScreen) +
- rep.numDepths * sizeof (XRenderDepth) +
- rep.numVisuals * sizeof (XRenderVisual));
- rlength = (rep.numFormats * sizeof (xPictFormInfo) +
- rep.numScreens * sizeof (xPictScreen) +
- rep.numDepths * sizeof (xPictDepth) +
- rep.numVisuals * sizeof (xPictVisual) +
- rep.numSubpixel * 4);
- xData = (void *) Xmalloc (rlength);
- nbytes = (int) rep.length << 2;
+ if ((rep.numFormats < ((INT_MAX / 4) / sizeof (XRenderPictFormat))) &&
+ (rep.numScreens < ((INT_MAX / 4) / sizeof (XRenderScreen))) &&
+ (rep.numDepths < ((INT_MAX / 4) / sizeof (XRenderDepth))) &&
+ (rep.numVisuals < ((INT_MAX / 4) / sizeof (XRenderVisual))) &&
+ (rep.numSubpixel < ((INT_MAX / 4) / 4)) &&
+ (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) ) {
+ xri = Xmalloc (sizeof (XRenderInfo) +
+ (rep.numFormats * sizeof (XRenderPictFormat)) +
+ (rep.numScreens * sizeof (XRenderScreen)) +
+ (rep.numDepths * sizeof (XRenderDepth)) +
+ (rep.numVisuals * sizeof (XRenderVisual)));
+ rlength = ((rep.numFormats * sizeof (xPictFormInfo)) +
+ (rep.numScreens * sizeof (xPictScreen)) +
+ (rep.numDepths * sizeof (xPictDepth)) +
+ (rep.numVisuals * sizeof (xPictVisual)) +
+ (rep.numSubpixel * 4));
+ xData = Xmalloc (rlength);
+ nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
+ } else {
+ xri = NULL;
+ xData = NULL;
+ rlength = nbytes = 0;
+ }
if (!xri || !xData || nbytes < rlength)
{
--
cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
main/libxrender/CVE-2013-1987-3.patch deleted 100644 → 0
+ 0
− 59
View file @ 42c51407
From 786f78fd8df6d165ccbc81f306fd9f22b5c1551c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 06:02:11 +0000
Subject: integer overflow in XRenderQueryPictIndexValues() [CVE-2013-1987 3/3]
The length and numIndexValues members of the reply are both CARD32 and
need to be bounds checked before multiplying by sizeof (XIndexValue) to
avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from
the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
---
diff --git a/src/Xrender.c b/src/Xrender.c
index a62c753..3102eb2 100644
--- a/src/Xrender.c
+++ b/src/Xrender.c
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ XRenderQueryPictIndexValues(Display *dpy,
xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReq *req;
xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReply rep;
XIndexValue *values;
- int nbytes, nread, rlength, i;
+ unsigned int nbytes, nread, rlength, i;
RenderCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
@@ -860,15 +860,22 @@ XRenderQueryPictIndexValues(Display *dpy,
return NULL;
}
- /* request data length */
- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
- /* bytes of actual data in the request */
- nread = rep.numIndexValues * SIZEOF (xIndexValue);
- /* size of array returned to application */
- rlength = rep.numIndexValues * sizeof (XIndexValue);
+ if ((rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) &&
+ (rep.numIndexValues < (INT_MAX / sizeof (XIndexValue)))) {
+ /* request data length */
+ nbytes = rep.length << 2;
+ /* bytes of actual data in the request */
+ nread = rep.numIndexValues * SIZEOF (xIndexValue);
+ /* size of array returned to application */
+ rlength = rep.numIndexValues * sizeof (XIndexValue);
+
+ /* allocate returned data */
+ values = Xmalloc (rlength);
+ } else {
+ nbytes = nread = rlength = 0;
+ values = NULL;
+ }
- /* allocate returned data */
- values = (XIndexValue *)Xmalloc (rlength);
if (!values)
{
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
--
cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
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