Commit 0293a79d authored by Leonardo Arena's avatar Leonardo Arena

main/krb5: security fixes (CVE-2015-8629, CVE-2015-8630, CVE-2015-8631). Fixes #5126

(cherry picked from commit eab4343d)
parent 4f4f6d42
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=krb5
pkgver=1.14
pkgrel=0
pkgrel=1
case $pkgver in
*.*.*) _ver=${pkgver%.*};;
......@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-server
$pkgname-server-ldap:ldap $pkgname-pkinit $pkgname-libs"
source="http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/${_ver}/krb5-$pkgver.tar.gz
mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
CVE-2015-8629.patch
CVE-2015-8630.patch
CVE-2015-8631.patch
krb5kadmind.initd
krb5kdc.initd
......@@ -119,16 +122,25 @@ libs() {
}
md5sums="0727968764d0208388b85ad31aafde24 krb5-1.14.tar.gz
c84a0c7d8014e3528524956ffdd1c3e9 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
51bfc721a58e4dd28ebcf2f600ff3455 CVE-2015-8629.patch
f8b6f512f94dcad5bfdc1250beaf2d11 CVE-2015-8630.patch
380b86bdaa1303a6bc7b0cc3672c3e43 CVE-2015-8631.patch
9c0e3bac122326cdbbbac068056ee8af krb5kadmind.initd
71131479c07a2d89b30a2ea18dd64e74 krb5kdc.initd
d94873a6a1ac6277adf2d25458eda9e5 krb5kpropd.initd"
sha256sums="cedb07fad8331e3ff2983d26e977a2ddba622f379c2b19bfea85bd695930f9e9 krb5-1.14.tar.gz
84007c7423f67db7a8b248b9643c49ef25f2d56ce15c2574eb41ecbf51bcd3f2 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
6c462dfa8202be953d3b9dc2acecb94b3576663caf7a1ceb1275b1dcb6b11171 CVE-2015-8629.patch
d87154deff5284b1a22d0c31de1b3c6276e4c2a94d7951b3cb31ed1b2ef405da CVE-2015-8630.patch
7c1860aeba4b0712b1fd0b46ed6acc882f36a5b5b7cbcaa8e496baca65bc881a CVE-2015-8631.patch
213a5b04f091e4644e856aabc38da586bd86c4616ab15f00eefca52fca7137d6 krb5kadmind.initd
577842c7fe4639a8e9dd349da40e514284dd53440bb71be58283faaf18508f9a krb5kdc.initd
1644639d83791bd871f3c89a53a7052ab52994d3ef03d1d675d4217130c1fa94 krb5kpropd.initd"
sha512sums="b33a85b37f6038e34ba4038c9d1cc6a0df027652cbeccd24e39b323a1ed1bc16305099df04654c80ba7e6b56bd3d3c2df95758add888f9ef8535cb78443684ff krb5-1.14.tar.gz
5a3782ff17b383f8cd0415fd13538ab56afd788130d6ad640e9f2682b7deaae7f25713ce358058ed771091040dccf62a3bc87e6fd473d505ec189a95debcc801 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
a4791794fc8cd675605ed0f9d39b099b2e83713c7038648529906490c36b1e92739f05ba6f5a1be9923459a01b45ffb04129e23313873fea2fd41c45f7f42f90 CVE-2015-8629.patch
c91415ff810ea1b3d8ba80d005bc40bb3595be4b7610b69d6c8c97bdcb290c1eb400997ccb091863d558bfb8a4cbb8f00557a690f60c0ada700ba76194960b0a CVE-2015-8630.patch
59b70cf6aa3f462fe8dab0f02e7f649f9615c5e40ad43517a9b9febd2c5d87b0d38f3e620ad6dd006c9ecbc9a4bbcab39655e518c6d37fbe74f40a888545ae79 CVE-2015-8631.patch
43b9885b7eb8d0d60920def688de482f2b1701288f9acb1bb21dc76b2395428ff304961959eb04ba5eafd0412bae35668d6d2c8223424b9337bc051eadf51682 krb5kadmind.initd
ede15f15bbbc9d0227235067abe15245bb9713aea260d397379c63275ce74aea0db6c91c15d599e40c6e89612d76f3a0f8fdd21cbafa3f30d426d4310d3e2cec krb5kdc.initd
45be0d421efd41e9dd056125a750c90856586e990317456b68170d733b03cba9ecd18ab87603b20e49575e7839fb4a6d628255533f2631f9e8ddb7f3cc493a90 krb5kpropd.initd"
From df17a1224a3406f57477bcd372c61e04c0e5a5bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 12:45:25 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Verify decoded kadmin C strings [CVE-2015-8629]
In xdr_nullstring(), check that the decoded string is terminated with
a zero byte and does not contain any internal zero bytes.
CVE-2015-8629:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to read beyond the end of allocated memory by sending a string
without a terminating zero byte. Information leakage may be possible
for an attacker with permission to modify the database.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8341 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
---
src/lib/kadm5/kadm_rpc_xdr.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/kadm_rpc_xdr.c b/src/lib/kadm5/kadm_rpc_xdr.c
index 2bef858..ba67084 100644
--- a/src/lib/kadm5/kadm_rpc_xdr.c
+++ b/src/lib/kadm5/kadm_rpc_xdr.c
@@ -64,7 +64,14 @@ bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
return FALSE;
}
}
- return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
+ if (!xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size))
+ return FALSE;
+ /* Check that the unmarshalled bytes are a C string. */
+ if ((*objp)[size - 1] != '\0')
+ return FALSE;
+ if (memchr(*objp, '\0', size - 1) != NULL)
+ return FALSE;
+ return TRUE;
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
From b863de7fbf080b15e347a736fdda0a82d42f4f6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 12:52:28 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Check for null kadm5 policy name [CVE-2015-8630]
In kadm5_create_principal_3() and kadm5_modify_principal(), check for
entry->policy being null when KADM5_POLICY is included in the mask.
CVE-2015-8630:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying a null policy value but including KADM5_POLICY in
the mask.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8342 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
---
src/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c b/src/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c
index 5b95fa3..1d4365c 100644
--- a/src/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c
+++ b/src/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c
@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
+ if (entry == NULL)
+ return EINVAL;
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
@@ -403,12 +405,12 @@ kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
+ if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
+ return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
- if (entry == NULL)
- return EINVAL;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
@@ -643,6 +645,8 @@ kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle,
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
+ if(entry == NULL)
+ return EINVAL;
if((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
@@ -651,10 +655,10 @@ kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle,
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
+ if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
+ return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
- if(entry == (kadm5_principal_ent_t) NULL)
- return EINVAL;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
tl_data_orig = entry->tl_data;
while (tl_data_orig) {
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