main/mercurial: fix CVE-2019-32902

Fixes alpine/aports#10376

main/mercurial/APKBUILD

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=mercurial
 pkgver=4.5.2
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="A scalable distributed SCM tool"
 url="https://www.mercurial-scm.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -14,10 +14,14 @@ subpackages="
 	$pkgname-vim:vim:noarch
 	$pkgname-zsh-completion:zshcomp:noarch
 	$pkgname-bash-completion:bashcomp:noarch"
-source="https://www.mercurial-scm.org/release/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz"
+source="https://www.mercurial-scm.org/release/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
+	CVE-2019-3902.patch
+	"
 builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
 
 # secfixes:
+#   4.5.2-r1:
+#   - CVE-2019-3902
 #   4.5.2-r0:
 #   - CVE-2018-1000132
 
@@ -66,4 +70,5 @@ bashcomp() {
 		"$subpkgdir"/usr/share/bash-completion/completions/${pkgname}
 }
 
-sha512sums="f70e40cba72b7955f0ecec9c1f53ffffac26f206188617cb182e22ce4f43dc8b970ce46d12c516ef88480c3fa076a59afcddd736dffb642d8e23befaf45b4941  mercurial-4.5.2.tar.gz"
+sha512sums="f70e40cba72b7955f0ecec9c1f53ffffac26f206188617cb182e22ce4f43dc8b970ce46d12c516ef88480c3fa076a59afcddd736dffb642d8e23befaf45b4941  mercurial-4.5.2.tar.gz
+f6a53411ba137661db283878ff1191ee13f879b171e6e97335ebc68e6276373ecff89a6ab16eec5eb572de9c909f5d4f81b726d15da56fa026a758482b5373f3  CVE-2019-3902.patch"

main/mercurial/CVE-2019-3902.patch

+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org>
+# Date 1546953576 -32400
+# Node ID 83377b4b4ae0e9a6b8e579f7b0a693b8cf5c3b10
+# Parent  6c10eba6b9cddab020de49fd4fabcb2cadcd85d0
+subrepo: reject potentially unsafe subrepo paths (BC) (SEC)
+
+In addition to the previous patch, this prohibits '~', '$nonexistent', etc.
+for any subrepo types. I think this is safer, and real-world subrepos wouldn't
+use such (local) paths.
+
+diff -r 6c10eba6b9cd -r 83377b4b4ae0 mercurial/subrepo.py
+--- a/mercurial/subrepo.py	Tue Jan 08 22:07:45 2019 +0900
++++ b/mercurial/subrepo.py	Tue Jan 08 22:19:36 2019 +0900
+@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@
+                 vfs.unlink(vfs.reljoin(dirname, f))
+ 
+ def _auditsubrepopath(repo, path):
++    # sanity check for potentially unsafe paths such as '~' and '$FOO'
++    if path.startswith('~') or '$' in path or util.expandpath(path) != path:
++        raise error.Abort(_('subrepo path contains illegal component: %s')
++                          % path)
+     # auditor doesn't check if the path itself is a symlink
+     pathutil.pathauditor(repo.root)(path)
+     if repo.wvfs.islink(path):
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org>
+# Date 1546952865 -32400
+# Node ID 6c10eba6b9cddab020de49fd4fabcb2cadcd85d0
+# Parent  31286c9282dfa734e9da085649b7ae5a8ba290ad
+subrepo: prohibit variable expansion on creation of hg subrepo (SEC)
+
+It's probably wrong to expand path at localrepo.*repository() layer, but
+fixing the layering issue would require careful inspection of call paths.
+So, this patch adds add a validation to the subrepo constructor.
+
+os.path.realpath(util.expandpath(root)) is what vfsmod.vfs() would do.
+
+diff -r 31286c9282df -r 6c10eba6b9cd mercurial/subrepo.py
+--- a/mercurial/subrepo.py	Tue Jan 08 21:51:54 2019 +0900
++++ b/mercurial/subrepo.py	Tue Jan 08 22:07:45 2019 +0900
+@@ -403,7 +403,16 @@
+         r = ctx.repo()
+         root = r.wjoin(path)
+         create = allowcreate and not r.wvfs.exists('%s/.hg' % path)
++        # repository constructor does expand variables in path, which is
++        # unsafe since subrepo path might come from untrusted source.
++        if os.path.realpath(util.expandpath(root)) != root:
++            raise error.Abort(_('subrepo path contains illegal component: %s')
++                              % path)
+         self._repo = hg.repository(r.baseui, root, create=create)
++        if self._repo.root != root:
++            raise error.ProgrammingError('failed to reject unsafe subrepo '
++                                         'path: %s (expanded to %s)'
++                                         % (root, self._repo.root))
+ 
+         # Propagate the parent's --hidden option
+         if r is r.unfiltered():