CVE-2019-5482.patch 1.47 KB
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From facb0e4662415b5f28163e853dc6742ac5fafb3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Vegas <>
Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2019 17:30:51 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] tftp: Alloc maximum blksize, and use default unless OACK is
 received

Fixes potential buffer overflow from 'recvfrom()', should the server
return an OACK without blksize.

Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-5482.html
CVE-2019-5482
---
 lib/tftp.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/tftp.c b/lib/tftp.c
index a7176cec80..346f293dc5 100644
--- a/lib/tftp.c
+++ b/lib/tftp.c
@@ -985,6 +985,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_connect(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
 {
   tftp_state_data_t *state;
   int blksize;
+  int need_blksize;
 
   blksize = TFTP_BLKSIZE_DEFAULT;
 
@@ -999,15 +1000,20 @@ static CURLcode tftp_connect(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
       return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL;
   }
 
+  need_blksize = blksize;
+  /* default size is the fallback when no OACK is received */
+  if(need_blksize < TFTP_BLKSIZE_DEFAULT)
+    need_blksize = TFTP_BLKSIZE_DEFAULT;
+
   if(!state->rpacket.data) {
-    state->rpacket.data = calloc(1, blksize + 2 + 2);
+    state->rpacket.data = calloc(1, need_blksize + 2 + 2);
 
     if(!state->rpacket.data)
       return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
   }
 
   if(!state->spacket.data) {
-    state->spacket.data = calloc(1, blksize + 2 + 2);
+    state->spacket.data = calloc(1, need_blksize + 2 + 2);
 
     if(!state->spacket.data)
       return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;