diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch b/main/libxvmc/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bba780364553f9c0e2ddb809abecb9e7ea475eba..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/main/libxvmc/0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From cf1a1dc1b9ca34a29d0471da9389f8eae70ddbd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:47:57 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Use _XEatDataWords to avoid overflow of rep.length
- shifting
-
-rep.length is a CARD32, so rep.length << 2 could overflow in 32-bit builds
-
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- configure.ac | 6 ++++++
- src/XvMC.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index b44f80d..f9d59a1 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ XORG_CHECK_MALLOC_ZERO
- # Obtain compiler/linker options for depedencies
- PKG_CHECK_MODULES(XVMC, x11 xext xv xextproto videoproto)
-
-+# Check for _XEatDataWords function that may be patched into older Xlib release
-+SAVE_LIBS="$LIBS"
-+LIBS="$XVMC_LIBS"
-+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_XEatDataWords])
-+LIBS="$SAVE_LIBS"
-+
- # Checks for library functions.
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([shmat])
-
-diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c
-index 5a4cf0d..b3e97ec 100644
---- a/src/XvMC.c
-+++ b/src/XvMC.c
-@@ -16,6 +16,18 @@
- #include <sys/time.h>
- #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h>
- #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+
-+#ifndef HAVE__XEATDATAWORDS
-+static inline void _XEatDataWords(Display *dpy, unsigned long n)
-+{
-+# ifndef LONG64
-+ if (n >= (ULONG_MAX >> 2))
-+ _XIOError(dpy);
-+# endif
-+ _XEatData (dpy, n << 2);
-+}
-+#endif
-
- static XExtensionInfo _xvmc_info_data;
- static XExtensionInfo *xvmc_info = &_xvmc_info_data;
-@@ -134,7 +146,7 @@ XvMCSurfaceInfo * XvMCListSurfaceTypes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num)
- surface_info[i].flags = sinfo.flags;
- }
- } else
-- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- }
-
- UnlockDisplay (dpy);
-@@ -207,7 +219,7 @@ XvImageFormatValues * XvMCListSubpictureTypes (
- ret[i].scanline_order = Info.scanline_order;
- }
- } else
-- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- }
-
- UnlockDisplay (dpy);
-@@ -278,7 +290,7 @@ Status _xvmc_create_context (
- _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2);
- *priv_count = rep.length;
- } else
-- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- }
-
- UnlockDisplay (dpy);
-@@ -359,7 +371,7 @@ Status _xvmc_create_surface (
- _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2);
- *priv_count = rep.length;
- } else
-- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- }
-
- UnlockDisplay (dpy);
-@@ -449,7 +461,7 @@ Status _xvmc_create_subpicture (
- _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2);
- *priv_count = rep.length;
- } else
-- _XEatData(dpy, rep.length << 2);
-+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- }
-
- UnlockDisplay (dpy);
-@@ -579,7 +591,7 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port,
-
- } else {
-
-- _XEatData(dpy, realSize);
-+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- UnlockDisplay (dpy);
- SyncHandle ();
- return -1;
---
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch b/main/libxvmc/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7cc7d0631e490b1554a052cde4757271f6c8d33f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/main/libxvmc/0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 2712383813b26475dc6713888414d842be57f8ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:50:02 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] integer overflow in XvMCListSurfaceTypes() [CVE-2013-1990
- 1/2]
-
-rep.num is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before multiplying
-by sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo) to come up with the total size to allocate,
-to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from
-the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/XvMC.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c
-index b3e97ec..5d8c2cf 100644
---- a/src/XvMC.c
-+++ b/src/XvMC.c
-@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ XvMCSurfaceInfo * XvMCListSurfaceTypes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num)
- }
-
- if(rep.num > 0) {
-- surface_info =
-- (XvMCSurfaceInfo*)Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo));
-+ if (rep.num < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo)))
-+ surface_info = Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo));
-
- if(surface_info) {
- xvmcSurfaceInfo sinfo;
---
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch b/main/libxvmc/0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e6ffa44ecb28d4bd915f382752aa996c0afcfa3d..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/main/libxvmc/0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 478d4e5873eeee2ebdce6673e4e3469816ab63b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:50:02 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] integer overflow in XvMCListSubpictureTypes()
- [CVE-2013-1990 2/2]
-
-rep.num is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before multiplying by
-sizeof(XvImageFormatValues) to come up with the total size to allocate,
-to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from
-the network past the end of the allocated buffer.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/XvMC.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c
-index 5d8c2cf..8d602ec 100644
---- a/src/XvMC.c
-+++ b/src/XvMC.c
-@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ XvImageFormatValues * XvMCListSubpictureTypes (
- }
-
- if(rep.num > 0) {
-- ret =
-- (XvImageFormatValues*)Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvImageFormatValues));
-+ if (rep.num < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XvImageFormatValues)))
-+ ret = Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvImageFormatValues));
-
- if(ret) {
- xvImageFormatInfo Info;
---
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch b/main/libxvmc/0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 70298e45a48595bc2daff91444cc1a6084134e82..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/main/libxvmc/0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From 5fd871e5f878810f8f8837725d548e07e89577ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 00:50:02 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] integer overflow in _xvmc_create_*()
-
-rep.length is a CARD32 and should be bounds checked before left-shifting
-by 2 bits to come up with the total size to allocate, though in these
-cases, no buffer overflow should occur here, since the XRead call is passed
-the same rep.length << 2 length argument, but the *priv_count returned to
-the caller could be interpreted or used to calculate a larger buffer size
-than was actually allocated, leading them to go out of bounds.
-
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/XvMC.c | 9 ++++++---
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c
-index 8d602ec..d8bc59d 100644
---- a/src/XvMC.c
-+++ b/src/XvMC.c
-@@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ Status _xvmc_create_context (
- context->flags = rep.flags_return;
-
- if(rep.length) {
-- *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2);
-+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2))
-+ *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2);
- if(*priv_data) {
- _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2);
- *priv_count = rep.length;
-@@ -366,7 +367,8 @@ Status _xvmc_create_surface (
- }
-
- if(rep.length) {
-- *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2);
-+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2))
-+ *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2);
- if(*priv_data) {
- _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2);
- *priv_count = rep.length;
-@@ -456,7 +458,8 @@ Status _xvmc_create_subpicture (
- subpicture->component_order[3] = rep.component_order[3];
-
- if(rep.length) {
-- *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2);
-+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2))
-+ *priv_data = Xmalloc(rep.length << 2);
- if(*priv_data) {
- _XRead(dpy, (char*)(*priv_data), rep.length << 2);
- *priv_count = rep.length;
---
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch b/main/libxvmc/0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fcefc106ee1c6925df78db83a137d1a7c7af94b8..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/main/libxvmc/0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From e9415ddef2ac81d4139bd32d5e9cda9394a60051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 01:20:08 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Multiple unvalidated assumptions in XvMCGetDRInfo()
- [CVE-2013-1999]
-
-The individual string sizes is assumed to not be more than the amount of
-data read from the network, and could cause buffer overflow if they are.
-
-The strings returned from the X server are assumed to be null terminated,
-and could cause callers to read past the end of the buffer if they are not.
-
-Also be sure to set the returned pointers to NULL, so callers don't try
-accessing bad pointers on failure cases.
-
-Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
----
- src/XvMC.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c
-index d8bc59d..cb42487 100644
---- a/src/XvMC.c
-+++ b/src/XvMC.c
-@@ -499,7 +499,6 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port,
- XExtDisplayInfo *info = xvmc_find_display(dpy);
- xvmcGetDRInfoReply rep;
- xvmcGetDRInfoReq *req;
-- char *tmpBuf = NULL;
- CARD32 magic;
-
- #ifdef HAVE_SHMAT
-@@ -510,6 +509,9 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port,
- here.tz_dsttime = 0;
- #endif
-
-+ *name = NULL;
-+ *busID = NULL;
-+
- XvMCCheckExtension (dpy, info, BadImplementation);
-
- LockDisplay (dpy);
-@@ -568,31 +570,31 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port,
- #endif
-
- if (rep.length > 0) {
--
-- int realSize = rep.length << 2;
--
-- tmpBuf = (char *) Xmalloc(realSize);
-- if (tmpBuf) {
-- *name = (char *) Xmalloc(rep.nameLen);
-- if (*name) {
-- *busID = (char *) Xmalloc(rep.busIDLen);
-- if (! *busID) {
-- XFree(*name);
-- XFree(tmpBuf);
-- }
-- } else {
-- XFree(tmpBuf);
-+ unsigned long realSize = 0;
-+ char *tmpBuf = NULL;
-+
-+ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
-+ realSize = rep.length << 2;
-+ if (realSize >= (rep.nameLen + rep.busIDLen)) {
-+ tmpBuf = Xmalloc(realSize);
-+ *name = Xmalloc(rep.nameLen);
-+ *busID = Xmalloc(rep.busIDLen);
- }
- }
-
- if (*name && *busID && tmpBuf) {
--
- _XRead(dpy, tmpBuf, realSize);
- strncpy(*name,tmpBuf,rep.nameLen);
-+ name[rep.nameLen - 1] = '\0';
- strncpy(*busID,tmpBuf+rep.nameLen,rep.busIDLen);
-+ busID[rep.busIDLen - 1] = '\0';
- XFree(tmpBuf);
--
- } else {
-+ XFree(*name);
-+ *name = NULL;
-+ XFree(*busID);
-+ *name = NULL;
-+ XFree(tmpBuf);
-
- _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
- UnlockDisplay (dpy);
---
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxvmc/0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch b/main/libxvmc/0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 725c99339d96ba21519f5727e2c523d152470679..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/main/libxvmc/0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 8c164524d229adb6141fdac8336b3823e7fe1a5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 14:47:30 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] Multiple unvalidated patches in CVE-2013-1999
-
-Al Viro pointed out that Debian started segfaulting in Xine for him,
-
-Reported-by: Al Viro
-Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
----
- src/XvMC.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/XvMC.c b/src/XvMC.c
-index cb42487..74c8b85 100644
---- a/src/XvMC.c
-+++ b/src/XvMC.c
-@@ -585,15 +585,15 @@ Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port,
- if (*name && *busID && tmpBuf) {
- _XRead(dpy, tmpBuf, realSize);
- strncpy(*name,tmpBuf,rep.nameLen);
-- name[rep.nameLen - 1] = '\0';
-+ (*name)[rep.nameLen - 1] = '\0';
- strncpy(*busID,tmpBuf+rep.nameLen,rep.busIDLen);
-- busID[rep.busIDLen - 1] = '\0';
-+ (*busID)[rep.busIDLen - 1] = '\0';
- XFree(tmpBuf);
- } else {
- XFree(*name);
- *name = NULL;
- XFree(*busID);
-- *name = NULL;
-+ *busID = NULL;
- XFree(tmpBuf);
-
- _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
---
-1.8.2.3
-
diff --git a/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD b/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD
index 61c9dc6b8e4425fca14e3b661fcae04bd56b1be2..8f45ff7cc3d9cd4cfc0e2a8cea0577f7e7ed25b3 100644
--- a/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/libxvmc/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=libxvmc
-pkgver=1.0.7
-pkgrel=1
+pkgver=1.0.8
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="X11 Video Motion Compensation extension library"
url="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/"
arch="all"
@@ -10,26 +10,9 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev"
depends=
depends_dev="xproto videoproto libxv-dev libx11-dev libxext-dev"
makedepends="$depends_dev libtool autoconf automake util-macros"
-source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXvMC-$pkgver.tar.bz2
- 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
- 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch
- 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch
- 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch
- 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch
- 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch
- "
+source="http://xorg.freedesktop.org/releases/individual/lib/libXvMC-$pkgver.tar.bz2"
_builddir="$srcdir"/libXvMC-$pkgver
-prepare() {
- cd "$_builddir"
- for i in $source; do
- case $i in
- *.patch) msg $i; patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/$i || return 1;;
- esac
- done
- libtoolize --force && aclocal && autoheader && autoconf \
- && automake --add-missing
-}
build() {
cd "$_builddir"
@@ -42,24 +25,6 @@ package() {
make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install || return 1
rm "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/*.la
}
-md5sums="3340c99ff556ea2457b4be47f5cb96fa libXvMC-1.0.7.tar.bz2
-839450035994be7232f049c3256967fd 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
-c02e3cc2530cd053a2ce47b0627bfdff 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch
-6a87be93e8e173fb132eb2607abea6eb 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch
-4eb70517ff9e5d14ddd676de60a72fd4 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch
-0aedb6b617afe07376c243e401b1f417 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch
-cbd25dbf846b42f2a5ba9a60f32005f3 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch"
-sha256sums="28f085fc8518a3dadfe355360705d50153051f09898093e69af806c0b437cea3 libXvMC-1.0.7.tar.bz2
-87f764bdb3a36c370f8f5e16ca29b9ed8ee7f57dc1f5470d3c9c2a320ec3329d 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
-475e39742256f1e09f0b84a640ab1a43c88ed6a05498978fdebb5d727a7ecab3 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch
-dc08b02502ca6620d7db4d60868bbf0bac7537a1e2ee3007b1107071b106f82e 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch
-98eb319ef77103b823af9ea0a33396797f2f63e0160c90efa1159d811b6496b7 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch
-f40ac752770cf248b182c4074dde59a46b8cbab1cf48252ac4dac4d35f7a5309 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch
-e7d2d21f5ed2109f3d62e6509bb85c020ba988d32667158bb1c4a7a16e561780 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch"
-sha512sums="c52175990062a2fb1636b7db589565e61d2e056e56a0954a8b98c1ccf8d72bf3182cd6f482762bf5ee4137fc24553a4d1b9c1e588671499b3b69b390f31c81e9 libXvMC-1.0.7.tar.bz2
-abd782276434449c2691eb4255e5b51625272191b38d7b3454c2dd3b958b24db1ac4fa1c93dfec060b9eacb3921542ee007b6848c94f299b6491f9a02dec23e8 0001-Use-_XEatDataWords-to-avoid-overflow-of-rep.length-s.patch
-5cec81d9649a70eedd87ffb961030612271830cf9d45686614d54698a331a09c49fbb1a1d0d60266e5b649dcbe8d6ab766422655fe623e0d4db8b393c7912721 0002-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSurfaceTypes-CVE-2013-19.patch
-e9f9f7bbff45f34b53b11c50a130135a594e49c1e95e2e3b75a74c951cde374a6c74542ccb3a25ff17d0b1fdf97d6ea41d59e7c56fd9565aa38ecd0e1bf0ec8b 0003-integer-overflow-in-XvMCListSubpictureTypes-CVE-2013.patch
-eda4d1a3710f6237c827485fdc93b302aa49a7293f509719f8f17a5250f20505c995323089d713ba5f9142d9deb3c158d54ed31515c416dd00b1fbbb4c77ac6a 0004-integer-overflow-in-_xvmc_create_.patch
-688efc3d0185af471e6829444f49f39204eb41c46a51cb861c78135b88b44b9a237d6e48c1524f13cc07615ada3945bf30f3374c582d496ed502bb61773c8eb1 0005-Multiple-unvalidated-assumptions-in-XvMCGetDRInfo-CV.patch
-3c390b9c804c1a2d4b3a5c38ecdaa35770bc78e4e2dcd7ce10c2bcf80db41fb9ecbe135c1136635b35062fadcb122857047f59f53529282e5379969554fe18a6 0006-Multiple-unvalidated-patches-in-CVE-2013-1999.patch"
+md5sums="2e4014e9d55c430e307999a6b3dd256d libXvMC-1.0.8.tar.bz2"
+sha256sums="5e1a401efa433f959d41e17932b8c218c56b931348f494b8fa4656d7d798b204 libXvMC-1.0.8.tar.bz2"
+sha512sums="781a53ad1d60a06019ed24150b85a96f2608e6ca0d876de9f06511c0e086cdf837804994e33b51ee8b3714150dc1d6060449e89ab7458476c8535b5b336147bf libXvMC-1.0.8.tar.bz2"